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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JEAN SINCLAIR,

Pe ti tioner-Appellan t,
vs.

JOHN W. TURNER,
Warden, Utah State Prison,

Case No.
10768

Respondent-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Jean Sinclair, appeals from the
denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Hearing was held on appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus on the 28th day of October,
1966, before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, District
Judge of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
following which the writ was denied and the appellant remanded back to the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court denying the petition
for writ of habeas corpus be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent fundamentally agrees with the
chronology of events as recited in the statement of
facts submitted in appellant's brief, but disagrees
with the remainder of the statement of facts as submitted by appellant. Accordingly, respondent offers
the following c.s a more detailed and accurate statement of evidence and facts connected with this
matter.
Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County cn
the 9th day of June, 1966, alleging: (1) publicity
thrmigh the various news media published prior to
and during the appellant's trial was prejudicial, de
privinq her of a right to a fair and impartial trial,
(2) supression of evidence by the State favorable to
appellant, (3) the State knowingly employed false
testimony during the trial, (4) failure of the jury to
comply with the court's instructions, (5) appellan1
was denied the right to confront witnessess claim·
ing the jury received information outside the courtroom, and (6) appellant was denied the right to fully
cross-examine a witness of the State.
1

The appellant had previously been convictrd
of first degree murder in the death of Don L. foster.
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ond upon the jury's recommendation of leniency,
was sentenced to life inprisonment on May 4, 1963.
On October 28, 1966, a hearing was had in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County before the
Honorable A. H. Ellett on appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
Andrew F. Wahlquist appeared as the first witness for appellant and testified that during the period of arrest and trial of the appellant, he was employed by a local television station as its news
editor. He testified that he did take some movinq
pictures of the appellant in a hallway at the courthouse while appellant was in custody (R-27). He
stated that he took no pictures of the members of
the jury (R-27) except at that time when the jury was
visiting the scene of the crime (R-28). He testified he
took no pictures of witness testifying at the trial
m-27) and specifically did not take any photographs
of Carl Kuehne or a LaRae Peterson, both "key"
vritnesses at the trial (R-27). He stated further that
before he took any pictures, he asked the trial judge
for permission to do so and received permission to
take pictures as long as the court was not in session
(R-31, 32). He stated further that some of the film he
took was later broadcast by the television station
for which he was employed (R-33). When questioned about the number of news media representatives present during the course of the trial, Mr. Wahlquist stated that there were reporters from each of
the two local newspapers and the three local television stations for a total of five.

James Warren Monroe testified for appellant
that during the period in question he was employed
by a local television and radio station (R-35), that he
took moving pictures of the appellant on the da.y of
her arrest when she was taken from a police ve
hic1o into the police station (R-36), which film was
shown that same evening by his employer. He
stated that he photographed crowds outside the
courtroom, that he assumed the jurors would be in
the pictures of the crowds, but none of the jurors
were identified (R-43). He stated that he did not
photograph the witnesses Keuhne or Peterson (R-43,
44).
Art Kent, Jr., testified for appellant that he was
the news manager of KUTV during the period in
question, that at that time there were approximately twenty thousand homes in the metropolitan SalL
Lake viewing area which would constitute the estimated television coverage of his station (R-46, 47)
In response to a question concerning what particular aspect of the trial Mr. Kent commented on during his news casts, he replied:
If I may, Mr. Mitsunaga, may I say "comment" is
not necessarily the correct term in this case. I think
"report" would be a better term ....
"Comment" implies opinion, and there was no
opinion expressed. As I recall, we covered the case
from its inception to its conclusion with periodic
and routine reports of facts as they happened and
events as the:v happened. (R-49)

David John Parr, also an employee of KUT'!
testified for appellant that he was a reporter for thar
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television station during the period in question. He
stated that he took some moving picture film of the
scene of the crime on the night of the crime, a_ppellant's arrest and her arraignment (R-51). He stated
he took pictures of the appellant when she was
brought to the courthouse from the jail (R-57), that
he photographed the jurors inspecting the scene
of the crime (R-58), that he did not photograph the
jury as they were entering or leaving the courtroom
(R-58), and that, in his opinion, KUTV did not give
more air time to the Sinclair matter than to other
homicide trials (H-58). He stated that any pictures
made inside the courtroom were with the consent
of the defense counsel and the judge (R-51). In response to a question from the court, Mr. Parr stated
that he had no knowledge of any community reputation for violence by the public toward people
accused of crime (R-51), nor of any public animosity
with respect or regard to homosexuality (R-62). He
also stated that the homosexual overtones connected with the Sinclair case were not a factor in the
amount of publicity connected with the case (R-65).
Testifying as to the causes for the publicity that
did exist prior to and during the Sinclair trial, Art
Kent stated that aside from the fact that Miss Sinclair was charged with first degree murder, other
factors tha.t might have been inovlved were that it
was a slow news day when the crime took place,
that crimes of violence attract more attention than
other crimes, the manner by which the crime was
committed, and the fact that the accused was a
woman (R-66, 67).
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Vard Stanley Jones testified for appellant that
during the period in question he was a reporter for
the Salt Lake Tribune, a local newspaper. He testified that during the course of the trial he atterideri
each day (7-70), that the circulation of the Salt Lake
Tribunte was between 109,000 and 115,000 (R-73). He
stated that the length of the trial had an effect 011.
the amount of news coverage given to the par+ic11lN
case, that if it had elements of interest to the public,
the interest increased; that this case had an element
of sensation about it by reason of the way the murder v11a.s committed and the circumstances surrounding it. and that there were homosexual overtones
as brought out by trial testimony (R-75). He stated
further that there were no journalists or reporters
of national reoutation or stature (R-79), that the Salt
Lake Tribune did not have a photographer stationed
outside the courtroom, that there were no featurs
articles of any of the jurors, nor any photographs of
any juror published in the Salt Lake Tribune (R-80).
Donald D. Beck testified that during the period
in question he was a court and crime reporter fer:
the Deseret News, a local newspaper. He stated that
at the time copies of police reports were distributed
by the Salt Lake City Police Department to members
of the press corps assigned to the police beat, containing the nature of the crime, when the arrest wos
made, statistical information, location of the crime:
that no confidential information was distributed to
the press corps (R-84). He stated that he reported th:-·
testimony as it developed at trial (R-86, 87).
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He stated a photograph of witnesses was taken
after they had testified (R-91), that there were no
photographs of the jury when it visited the scene
of the crime (R-91), and that he did not project any
testimony until it had been brought out in the trial
(R-93).

Harry Clark was called to testify for appellant
and stated that at the time in question he was the
bailiff assigned to the trial judge. He described the
location of the press table inside the bar, and the
location of additional spectators' chairs that were
placed inside the bar (R-95, 97). He stated that the
spectators chairs inside the bar were only for attorneys, law students, journalists, and student
journalists (R-97). He also stated that the courtroom
was qenerally filled to capacity with spectators. He
testified that he did not observe any representatives
of the television media taking pictures inside the
courtroom nor any photographs taken of the participants of the trial inside the courtroom (R-100). He
stated that there was at least a space of three feet
between the feet 0£ the spectators inside the bar
and the chairs located at the counsel table (R-101).
He further stated that a loud speaker system was installed in the trial courtroom because a State's witness claimed to be suffering from a severe case of
laryngitis (R-102).
Sumner Hatch, defense counsel for appellam
at trial, testified as to incidents of movie cameras
Photographing Mr. Hatch and the appellant at the
reading of the verdict or sentence (R-115). A motion
fur mistrial was made (R-116). He stated also that a
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magazine was found on the floor under a spectator's
chair inside the bar, and that the cover of the magazine was in plain view (R-117). He stated further that
while the jury was entering or leaving the courtroom he overheard conversation with regard to
homosexuality involving the defendant (R-119), but
that he could not say whether the jurors were close
enough to hear the conversation (R-120). Mr. Hatch
testified that he did not move for a mistrial because
of crowded courtroom conditions, that he made no
motion for a mistrial because of television pictures
being taken, that he did not protest each time pictures were taken (R-120). He did protest picture tai:ing initially on the first day, did make a motion for a
mistrial when moving pictures were being taken
for television at the time of sentence (R-120, 121).
Officer Glen Cahoon of the Salt Lake Ciiy
Police Department testified for appellant that certain
police raports may have been disseminated to the
press corps, but that no statement of witnesses wern
shown to the press regarding the Sinclair case CR127). He stated further that the magazine story appearing in the national publication (P-7) was
distorted (R-128).
Counsel stipulated as to the existence of the
magazine articles appearing in three nationally
distributed mago.zines, which articles carried storit:?2
involving the Don Foster murder. The magazines
were offered into evidence as proposed petitioner',
Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, but were not udmitted into PV
dence. Counsel further stiplated as to the circula·
tion in the Salt LakP nren. of propos,-:>d Exhibits p.·i
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at 675-700, P-8 at 250, and P-9 at 490. In refusing to
admit proposed Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, the trial court
indicated that they would be made available to the
Utah Supreme Court (R-131, 132).
Robert E. Nielsen testified for appellant. He
stated that he was a juror during the Sinclair tridl
(R-133). He stated that going to and from the jury box
he did not overhear any of the conversation of the
spectators concerning the case or of personalities
involved in the case (R-134). With respect to proposed Exhibit P-7, he testified that the first time he
had seen that magazine was at 1:30 p.m. that particular day (October 28, 1966) (R-135). The witness further testified that he did not hear any conversation
regarding homosexuality. from any of the spectators
during the course of the trial (R-136).
Appellant's next witness was Elroy Nielsen. He
testified that he was a spectator at the Sinclair trial
(R-138). He stated that during the course of the trial
he did not see a copy of the magazine designated as
P-7 (R-138), nor did he overhear any conversation
reqarding homosexuality made in the presence of
the jurors (R-138).
Other witnesses were called by appellant, in·
eluding Eunice Carpenter, a matron of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office, and Richard C. Dibblee, the
chief criminal deputy, Salt Lake County Attorney
· t the time the homicide complaint was filed against
Miss Sinclair. Their testimony will not be referred
to by the respondent.

lCl
It should be pointed out that most of the wltnesses for the appellant testified to the conditions
of the courtroom, the large number of spectators,
and the existance of a table inside the bar for personnel of the news media.
Counsel stipulated that reporters for the various
news media covered the trial, that they took sornc;
pictures, and they wrote stories about the trial for
their papers or news accounts for their television
stations. The stipulation was broadened to include
the time of arrest, the preliminary hearing, and the
trial (R-45). It should be pointed out, however, tha.t
the press were excluded in the preliminary healing (R-86).
Films shown over local television stations were
shown to the court during the hearing on appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. AdmitleC
into evidence were newscast scripts, news accounts
published in the Salt Lake Tribune and news cw
counts published in the Deseret News.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYIN(;
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BY CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS
NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL OR DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.

Appellant seeks her release and discharge fron;
the Utah State Prison primarily on the ground that
publicity prior to and during her trial deprived her
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of ,) fdir and impartial trial. Appellant also claims
that certain influences in the courtroom were disruptive, thereby depriving her of a fair trial. Respondent will first examine the appellant's claim
with regard to prejudicial publicity.
Prejudicial nevvs reporting is a very vague and
fluid concept, but since it is the standard currently
used by the courts, an attempt must be made to define lt. Since all news concerning the investigation
of a crime and the trial of criminal cases is not to
be criticized or suppressed, the courts have been
c~inc2rned with that which is prejudicial to the rights
of ti.ie defendant to have a fair trial. Recent cases in
pm-~·J determining that the right of the accused were
vioL~ted are Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 352, 14 L.Ed 2d
543, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965), Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U. S. 333, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966), Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1250, 79 S.Ct. 1171,
(1959), and Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 6 L.Ed. 2d
751, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961). In each of these cases thE':
United States Supreme Court found fundamental
error of such gravity as to set aside the conviction
of the persons involved on the grounds of prejudiCldl news publicity and improper jury conduct.
However, neither the United States Supreme
Court, nor this court, has been willing to place any
:l;rect limitation on the freedom traditionally exercL~ed by the news media upon the theory that "what
transpires in the courtroom is public property." See
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 91 L.Ed. 154G,
l'JSl, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947). Indeed, there is nothing
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that proscribes the press from reportinCJ events that
transpire in the courtroom. Sheppard v. Maxwell,
op. cit. 16 L.Ed. 2d at 620.
The question then becomes, and the issue
squarely before this court is, in what way did the
reporting of the Sinclair trial (Don Foster's murder)
endanger the proper functioning of the criminr.l
process and, in particular, jeopardize the right of
Miss Sinclair to a fair and impartial trial?
An examination must be made of the publici1y
in the Sinclair case on the basis of pre-trial publicity
and on the basis of publicity during the trial.
As to pre-trial publicity, the record reveals the
Salt Lake Tribune. January 20, 1953, printed a story
]nvolving the arrest and jailing of Miss Sinclair for
first degree murder. The article relates that Miss Sinclair was arrested in connection with the "ambush
shotgun slaying" of a Salt Lake service station operator. The article further relates that evidence was presented to the County Attorney's office and a complaint issued. The article carried a photograph of
Miss Sinclair in custody of two Salt Lake police officers. The articles states that Captain Fillis, plainclothes division commander, declined to make any
comment on the evidence "other than that it was
sufficient to obtain a first degree murder complaint."
The article further quotes Captain Fillis as stating
that the Foster murder is " ... the most bizarre murder case that I have ever been involved in." (P-5)
Pre-trial publicity over local television station

13
include the first account on January 5, 1962, wherein the murder of Don Foster was described.
Subsequent television coverage includes a
statement that Miss Sinclair had been charged wHh
first degree murder on the afternoon of January 19,
1963. The news account includes a film of Miss Sinclair, an account of the murder of Don Foster, and
the statement that "Captain Fillis had no comment
on any points of evidence gathered by the police
department. Miss Sinclair will be arraigned on the
murder charges Monday morning, before City Judge
J. Patton Neeley. She is being held without bail."
On January 20, 1963, the television script indicated:
A forty-five year old woman will be arrainged on

murder charges tomorrow morning in city court.
Jean Sinclair was charged yesterday in connection
with an ambush shot gun slaying of Don Leroy
Foster on January 5. The woman was arrested by
City detectivE:s in her home in South Salt Lake.

Television news coverage on January 21, 1963,
includes a recitation that Miss Sinclair was arraigned
in Salt Lake City Court on charges of first degroe
murder. It recites the fact that she was arrested on
the previous Saturday for the "shotgun slaying of a
th\rty-three year old Don Leroy Foster while he was
qetting out of his car in front of the Susan Kay Apartments here in Salt Lake." The story further recounts
the fact that,
Although Miss Sinclair, a nursing home operator
lw.<l been held without bail since her arrest on Sat-
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nn1ay, Judge Stewart M. Hansen of the Third
District Court, today set bail at $20,000. Later today Miss Sinclair was released from the county jail
after bail had been posted for her.
Mrs. LaRay Peterson, of Kearns, the companion of
the shotgun victim, Don Leroy Foster, had told
Sergeant Glen Cahoon, of the Salt Lake City Police
Department, that she did not see the attacker the
night of the shooting.
However, Mrs. Peterson does admit to an acquaintance with the suspect Miss Sinclair ....

The fact that the preliminary examination had
commenced was also reported by the television
media. February 20, 1963, it was reported that the ,
exclusion rule barring press and spectators from
the courtroom had been invoked by the defense
counsel, that the State presented three witnesses
for the prosecution, and the defense presented three
witnesses.
February 28, 1963, Miss Sinclair was bound over
to the District Court to stand trial for first degree
murder. This was reported by local television.
Along with the report that Miss Sinclair had been
bound over was the fact that Mrs. LaRae Peterson, i
a previous witness during the preliminary examination, was being recalled to the witness stand.
The script states:
... and she felt she was entitled to legal counsel.
An exclusion rule had been invoked at the request
of the defense, only those directly concerned with
the hearing were admitted.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Peterson's attorney, Jim Mit-
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sunaga, appeared in city court and was promptly
ordered out by Judge Neeley.
Mr. Mi tsunaga petitioned District Judge Steward
Hanson for a writ of mandamus, to force Judge
Neeley to admit him.
Judge Stewart (Hanson) issued a temporary writ,
and an order to Judge Neeley to show cause why
the writ should not be made permanent.
.Judge Neeley responded rapidly ... he recessed the
court, and went up to the third floor to show cause
to Judge Hanson.
After hearing Judge Neeley, and after the defense
refused to waive the exclusion rule, the writ was
denied by Judge Hanson.
And attorney Mitsunaga remained outside . . . .
Late this afternoon, Jud;::e Marcellus K. Snow ordered Miss Sinclair held without bail in the county
jail, until her district court trial was completed.
After long arguments before the judge, Miss Sinclair
was booked into the jail and her $20,000 bail revoked.

The 10 o'clock news on the same day, February
28, was essentially a recap of the previous story. On
March 4, television media carried the following
story:
Forty-five year old Jean Sinclair was to have been
arraigned in District Court on charges of first degree murder.
Salt Lake City Judge J. Patton Neeley had suggested last Thursday that Miss Sinclair be arraigned
today and she was bound over to the District Court.
Upon the request of Attorney Jay Banks, arraignment was set for next Monday at 10 o'clock in the
morning.
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Miss Sinclair was charged with the .January 5 shotgun slaying of Don Leroy Foster in Salt Lake City.
Judge Marcellus K. Snow allowed the continuation
and will handle the arraignment next Monday.

Although the record reflects there was som0
publicity connected with the murder of Don Foster,
the arrest of appellant, her arraignment and pre
liminary examination, respondent submits that in no
instance was any of the pretrial publicity in any way
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

Respondent submits that at any time there is c_
shotgun assassination in the parking lot of a public
apartment complex, that such murder will be considered newsworthy by the news media and will
command substantial news coverage. Once a crime
of violence of this type occurs in a community, the
public demands to know what is being done by its
local law enforcement agencies. As was pointed
out by the SpeciaJ Committee on Radio, Television
and the Administration of Justice of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York in its Final Reporl
with Recommendations on Freedom of the Press
and Fair Trial, Judge Harold R Medina, chairman, a:
page 28:
. . . The police are rnquired by the community to
demonstrate constantly and concretely their capacity to fulfill their responsibilities, among which the
protection of society from criminal conduct ranks
foremost. Specifically, when crimes of violence
occur, in particular those of murder, assault, rape.
and robbery, creating widespread apprehension and
at times holding the community in a grip of terror.
the public demands to know what is being done to
apprehend the perpetrator.
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Respondent submits that the pretrial publicity
given to the Foster murder and the subsequent arrest and preliminary examination of Jean Sinclair
was the result of the public's demand to know that
the local law enforcement agency was hard at work
to maintain peace and order in the community. The
publication by the press and other news media of
the arrest of Miss Sinclair, that a complaint had been
filed charging her with first degree murder, and the
subsequent reporting by the news media of the
results of the preliminary examination were the only
items reported by the press during the pre-trial period. The account in the Salt Lake Tribune was quick
to point out that Captain Fillis refused to comment
on any of the evidence (P-5). In none of the television reports was there any comment upon any of
the evidence but merely recaps of the fact that
Foster had been killed by a shotgun, that Sinclair
had been charged, a brief background of Sinclair
to effect that she was a nursing home operator,
the location of the murder, and related items of
background material which in no way could be considered prejudicial to the appellant.
Examining the publicity that occurred during
the course of the appellant's trial, television coverage commenced April 15, 1963, with the comment
that, "Another first degree murder trial opened in
Third District Court today, this time involving a Salt
Lake nursing home operator." The television script
reports the charge, and that the court action of that
first day was primarily confined to the selection o:t
c1 jury. It opined that the trial would be lengthy,
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with "38 witnesses subpoened by the State alone."
The script indicates that the public would not be
excluded from the trial as they were during the preliminary hearing.
On April 16, television script reports the second
day of the murder trial of appellant. The openinq
statement of the District Attorney was reported:
District Attorney Banks said Miss Sinclair and Mrs.
LaRae Peterson had carried on an intimate relationship . . . and that this was threatened by Mr.
Foster.
He said the State's evidence will show that the defendant had planned for some time to murder
Foster, and that she had admitted the killing less
than an hour after it had occurred the night of January 5.
Defense counsel Sumner J. Hatch challenged the
State to prove his client guilty . . . and said he
would produce evidence that would convict the
State's star witness of the shotgun killing. He said
his client has an alibi for the time the killing took
place.

On April 17, local television reported the examination by the jury of the scene of the crime and
recapped the opening statements of the District At·
torney and defense counsel.
On April 18, the coverage continued with the
recap of the testimony of Carl Kuehne. In the script
Kuehne testified he,
. . . bought the alleged murder weapon, and ha<l
talked to Miss Sinclair about killing 33 year old
Donald Leroy Foster.
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On April 19, the television coverage was limited
to 25 seconds with the following script, no film:
Witnesses for the prosecution continued to testify
today in the first degree murder trial of Jean Sinclair. The S'llt Lake resident Vaughn Humphreys
testified he broh off his friendship with the defendant after learning of the plot to kill Don Leroy
Foster.
Mrs. LaRae Peterson, a divorcee, who was with
Foster the night he was shotgunned to death, testified she was acquainted with the defendant prior
to the slaying.

Subsequent to April 19, through the end of the
trial, local television gave the trial continued coverage on the following dates, for the following times,
and in some instances showing film as indicated,
generally restating the charges against Miss Sinclair and recapping testimony as it was admitted
during the trial:
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
May
May
May
May

22 (film)
22
"
23
"
23
"
24
"
24
"
29
"
29
"
30 (no film)
1 (film)
2
"
3
"
4
"

1 minute 5 seconds

"

"

"

52 seconds

"

"

1 minute
58 seconds
53 seconds

"

6 o'clock news
10 "
"
6
"
"
10 "
"
6
"
"

10

6
10
"
"
6
30 seconds
10
45 seconds
1 minute 15 seconds 10
10
1 minute
2 minutes 10 seconds 10

"

"

"

"
"

"
"

"

"
"
"
"

"
"

"

"
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May 6 (no film) 75 seconds
6
May 13 (no film) 50 seconds
10
May 29 (film)
1 minute 30 seconds 6

"
"
"

"

Closing arguments were reported on the lD
o'clock news on May 2, showing a film, the coverage lasting one minute fifteen sec(mds. Both side;
rested May 2. On May 3, television reported the jury
still out, showing film coverage lasting one minute
Coverage on May 4, reported the jury verdict oi
first degree murder, showing film, coverage la::·t
ing two minutes ten seconds. On May 6, television
reported that sentence would be delayed for Miss
Sinclair for a period of one week_ No film was shown
coverage lasting twenty-five seconds. On May 11,
film coverage showed Miss Sinclair's sentencinc;
postponed agc:dn, coverage lasting fifty seconds
May 29, 6 o'clock news reported Sinclair and her
counsel arguing motion for new triaL Film shown,
coverage lasting one minute thirty seconds. On
June 5, film coverage on the 6 o'clcck news Jasti;cq
one minute reported the sentencing of Miss Sinclair;
10 o'clock news had one minute ten seconds coverage with film.
Newspaper coverage commenced the first d:i;'
of the trial. Both the Salt Lake Tribune and the Des·
eret News reported day-by-day the testimony pre
sented during the trial. Coverage was also given to
the jury verdict and the sentence of the court
The record is devoid of what instructions the
trial court gave the jury with respect to the juro1~'
wading newspapers, listening to radio commen
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laries or viewing television. We must assume,
thsrefore, that the impartiality of the jury remained
during the course of the trial, that the trial judge
'Nas correct in denying appellant's motion for mistrial when a copy of a magazine (P-7) had been
found in the courtroom.
Questions asked the jurors on voir dire examinaJi on regarding their knowledge of the case or
their contact with any pretrial publicity are not part
of the record. Again it must be presumed that some
measure of discretion must be held to reside in the
tr~c'll iudge in determining which of the panel were
competent to serve as jurors. We must also presume that the appellant, represented by able trial
cmmsel, was satisfied with the panel ultimately
SE' 1scted and sworn.
Since the record is not before us, we ml~st
dgain presume that the jurors sworn to serve were
duly and properly instructed by the court, that the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-28 (1953) were
complied with requiring the court to admonish the
jury regarding conversations among themselves
or with others on any subject connected with the
trial, and not to form or express any opinion thereon
until the case was submitted to them.
There is no evidence before this court that any
iu1or d1sobeyed any instruction of the trial court.
Nor is there any evidence that the jury, or any membe>r thereof, came into contact with any publicity
c onceming the trial that could in any way be
deemed "prejudicial." Quite the contrary, at the
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.~

he,1r'1ng on appellant's petition, the appellant pro-

duced testimony for one juror that he was not familiar with any story involving the appellant appearing in a magazine entitled Startling Detective (~-7
not admitted); that the first time he saw that maaazine was at 1:30 p.m. on the day of the hearing (R137). Nor did he hear any conversation at cill regarding homosexuality (R-136). He stated he did not
hear the word "homosexuality" from any spectator
while he was going to and from the courtroom (R136).
The record is devoid of any evidence that there
was any misconduct on the part of the spectators
which may have influenced the jury. In fact, the
appellant's witness ElRoy Nielson said that he had
attended part of the trial, that he did not see a copy
of plaintiff's Exhibit 7 while he was in attendance,
nor did he overhear any conversation regarding
homosexuality made in the presence of jurors (R-138).
Appellant has not demonstrated sufficiently that
pretrial publicity and publicity during the trial were
of such a nature as to require the trial court to disregard the jurors' statements of impartiality on voir
dire examination.
The basic problem involving pretrial publicity
is whether individual jurors who have seen or heard
such publicity fulfill the constitutional standard of
impcffliality. Where a juror has been exposed to pre
tria.l n11 blicity, but asserts that he is impartial, it hc1~
been held adequate and not prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial. See for example Stroble
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v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 96 L.Ed. 872, 72 S.Ct. 599
(1952).

In the case of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879), although not indicating that
the views of the juror in question were based on
pretrial publicity, the court there stated:
In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal
education, every case of public interest is almost,
as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention
of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and
scarcely any one can be found among those best
fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it,
and who has not some impression or some opinion
in respect to its merits.

See also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 30 L.Ed. 709
(1887), wherein the court holds that the judgment of
the trial court as to the competency of the juror upon
his declaration under oath or otherwise is conclusive wherein the juror in question testified that
he had heard of the case through the newspapers,
read what was represented to be the evidence, and
talked about it since that time, but he did not think
he had ever expressed an opinion on the case, that
he was not conscious of any bias or prejudice that
might prevent him from dealing with the defendant
impartially, and that he thought he could try the
case according to the law and the evidence given
in court.
See also Theide v. Utah, 159 U.S. 510, 40 L.Ed.
237 (1895), wherein the Supreme Court denied a
challenge for cause of a juror who testified on his
voir dire that he had read an account in a locnl
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newspaper of the homicide with which the defendant was accused, had formed some impression
touching it, which he could lay aside, and could
try the case fairly and impartially on the evidence.
See also annotation Juror Reading Newspaper, 3
L.Ed. 2d 1250, and annotation Juror Reading Newspaper, 31 A.LR. 2d 417.
The United States Supreme Court has recently
expressed the opinion that:
It is not required, however, that the jurors be
totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.
In these days of swift widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be
expected to arouse the interest of the public in the
vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to
serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is
particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the
mere existence of any pre-conceived notion as to the
guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is
sufficient to rebuke the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard. It is sufficient the juror can
lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.
Irvin v. Dowd, op. cit.

Recent decisions wherein the defendant was
held not to have been denied a fair trial by reason
of pretrial publicity as alleged by defendant include United States ex rel., Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S.
454, 100 L.Ed. 1331, 76 S.Ct. 965 (1956); Latham v.
Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963). A thorough ac·
count of recent decisions including the manner of '
the alleged "prejudicial" pretrial publicity in each
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case is contained in an annotation entitled Pretrial
Publicity-Fair Trial. 10 L.Ed. 2d 1243, § 4 (C), page
1255. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541,
8 L.Ed. 2d 98, 82 S.Ct. 955, reh. den. 370 U.S. 965,
8 L.Ed. 2d 834, 82 S.Ct. 1575, (1962), and Reizzo v.
United States, 304 F.2d 810, (8th Cir. 1962), cert. den.
371 U.S. 890, 9 L.Ed. 2d 123, 83 S. Ct. 188 (1962).
In the case of United States v. Synodinos, 218 F.
Supp. 479 (DC Utah 1963), the court denied a motion
for a change of venue on the ground of pretrial
publicity in an action involving interstate transmission of wagering information. Claiming substantial
newspaper, radio, and television publicity constituting prejudice to the defendants, the court held that
the newspaper accounts were merely an objective
reporting of the court record.
As stated in the annotation, Pretrial PublicityFair Trial. op. cit, the decisions holding that a defendant was deprived of a fair trial as a result of
pretrial publicity have been far outnumbered by
those holding that the defendant was not deprived
of a fair trial, citing a collection of cases commencing at page 1251. The annotation further compiles
cases involving pretrial publicity wherein the allegation of the defendant regarding pretrial publicity
had not been sustained, and also the failure of the
r1efendant to seek certain forms of relief.
In those instances wherein the defendant has
sought reversal of a conviction or has sought a writ
of habeas corpus on the general ground that pretrial publicity deprived him of a fair trial, or where
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he has alleged that it was error to deny a motion for
change of venue or continuance, or challenges to
jurors involving pretrial publicity, the allegations
of the defendant have generally not been sustained.
For example, in affirming convictions despite claim3
of prejudicial pretrial publicity, the courts have referred to the failure of the defendant to (1) seek a
change of venue, (2) seek a continuance, (3) avail
himself of the opportunity to ask jurors such questions as might reveal whether they were influenced
by pretrial publicity, (4) exhaust his challenges,
(5) challenge individual jurors for cause, (6) challenge the whole jury panel, or, (7) raise the issue of
pretrial publicity until after he was convicted. Similarily, the courts have rejected the defendant's
claim that he was prejudiced by pretrial publicity
where he either has selected to be tried without jury
or hcts expressed his satisfaction with the members
c,£ the jury. See cases cited in annotation Pretrial
Publicity-Fair Trial, op. cit.
It is well settled that the petitioner in a habeas
corpus proceeding has the burden of proving the
grounds on which he relies for his release by evidence that is clear and convincing. See Workman
v. Turner, ______ Utah 2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402, (1967), Mc·
Guffey v. Turner, ________ Utah 2d ________ , 423 P.2d 166
(1967), Beck v. Washington, op. cit.
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to
prove any grounds upon which release can be
granted, and further, the evidence adduced by appellant at the hearing was less than clear and convincing. Moreover, respondent submits that the rec-
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ord discloses no publicity either in the pretrial stage
or during the trial which could be considered to be
a clear and convincing proof of prejudice and unfair trial.
Respondent submits the totality of the circumstances indicate that the appellant was afforded a
fair trial. Admittedly, there was publicity, but it
lacked the animadversion which, respondent submits, is necessary to constitute prejudice to appellant.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that
any of the jurors vvere in any way influenced by
either pretrial publicity or news accounts during
the trial. Quite the contrary. Although it can be
established that the Don Foster murder and the subsequent arrest 01 Jean Sinclair did command a substa_ntial amount of publicity from the various news
rnedia within Salt Lake County, it cannot be said
that such publicity was prejudicial.
In no instance in the Sinclair case do we find
any type of publicity similar to that which occurred
in Sheppard v. Maxwell, op, cit., wherein front page
headlines announced "testify now in death, Bay
doctor is ordered", "Doctor balks at lie test; retells
story". "Kerr (Captain of Cleveland police) urges
Sheppard's arrest"; nor do we have editorial bombardment with front page charges that somebody
is "getting away with murder". In no instance were
any of the proceedings in the Sinclair case televised, as in the Sheppard case in which the coronen3 inquest was televised in a school gymnasium,
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or the in the Estes case. Nor did the press sta_mpede the law enforcement agencies and prosecutors
into arresting and charging Sinclair with the murder of Foster a_s occurred with Sheppard for the
murder of his wife with such headlines as "Why
Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect", "Why Isn't Sam
Sheppard in Jail", and "Quit Stalling-Bring Him
In".
The Sinclair case did not attract journalists and
ne~Ns commentators of national prominence as did
the Sheppa_rd case, nor did we have the printing
0£ indiivdual pictures of prospective jurors in the
local newspapers.

There is great disimilarity between the Sinclair
case and the Sheppard case. In the Sinclair case no
local nev11spaper featured the home life of an alternate juror, nor were the jurors separated into two
groups to pose for photographs which appeared
tn newspapers, taken while the jury was sequestered. In S1nclair we have no radio broadcasts of
debates staged by newspaper reporters in which
Sinclair's counsel was accused of throwing road
blocks in the way of the prosecution. Nor do we ,
have reports in any news media of testimony not
produced at trial or evidence not produced at trial.
Respondent submits that the "totality of circumstances" in the Estes and Sheppard cases are
totally different than what occurred during the Sincla_ir case.
In commenting on the obvious abuses that occurred in the Sheppard trial, the Supreme Court ir1-
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dic:i.ted that the trial court might well have proscribed extra-judicial statements by any lawyer,
oarty, witness, or court official which involves prejudicial matters such as the refusal of Sheppard to
submit to interrogation or take any lie detector tests;
any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the
idenity of prospective witnesses or their probable
testimonies; any belief in guilt or innocence; or
like statements concerning the merits of the case,
citing State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d
841, 850 (1964), in which the court interpreted Canon
20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements. The
Supreme Court further stated that the trial court, belng advised of potential prejudicial impact of publicity, could have requested the appropriate city ar..d
county officials to promulgate a regulation with respect to dissemination of information about the case
by their employees. Also, that reporters who wrote
or broadcast prejudicial stories could have been
warned as to the impropriety of publishing material
not introduced in the proceedings.
Again, a comparison of the Sinclair and Shepp::nd cases in light of the suggestions of the United
States Supreme Court is warranted. In no instance
in the Sinclair case does the record reflect any pubJlcation of prejudicial matter with regard to interrogation of Sinclair or lie detector tests, any statement
made by Sinclair to officials, the identity of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony, any belief in guilt or innocence or like statements concerning the merits of the case. Nor is there any evidence
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of potcmtia_l or real prejudicial impact of publicity
with respect to dissemination of information by public employees.
Examining now the alleged disruptive influences in the courtroom during appellant's trial, the
bailiff testified that he had no difficulty in controlling
the crowd in the courtroom (R-101), that the spectators were quiet in the courtroom (R-102), and that
to his knowledge there were no photographs of any
kind taken during the course of the trial (R-100).
None of the matters of which appellant claim'3
as disruptive were of such gravity as to require the
court to discharge appellant. As a matter of fact, the
court considered many of these complaints in the
previous case of State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389
P.2d 465 (1964), wherein the court stated at 389 P.2d
470:
We have considered and find without merit various
other claimed errors in rulings on evidence; and also
a number of alleged improprieties in the conduct of
the attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and spectators talking to each other, exchanging greetings, shaking
hands, and a spectator soliciting autographs. Considering the fact that this trial attracted a great
deal of public attention, and that it lasted for about
three weeks, it would be strange indeed if some incident short of perfect decorum had not occurred,
particularly short of what defense counsel now demands. It is agreed that some of the conduct complained of may not have been exemplary, and that
those involved in an official capacity in the trial
should avoid any familiarity beyond discreet and reserved civility with the parties, witnesses and
jurors.

1
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Under our statute, which requires that errors which
do not effect the essential rights of the parties be
disregarded, we could not properly interfere with
the jury's verdict unless upon review of the whole
case it should appear that there was error of sufficient gravity that the defendant's right were prejudiced in some substantial way. We have found nothing of any such consequence here. (Citing Utah Code
Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), and State v. Siddoway, 61
Utah 189, 211 P. 968 (1922).

Respondent is not unmindful of many situations
where pretrial publicity or publicity during the trial
have resulted in unfair trials and have deprived the
accused of a fair trial, e.g. Estes v. Texas, op. cit.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, op. cit. However, the respondent submits there are many contributions the news
media can make during a trial. As stated in Fair Trial
and Free Press, American Bar Association Institute
of Judicial Administration Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Paul C. Reardon.
Chairman, 1966, P. 50:
During the trial, there are several important contributions the news media can make. First, informed
and intelligent reporting can educate the publicmany of whom have never been in a courtroomon the workings of the criminal process. Second,
such reporting can help to insure that the conduct
of those who participate in the trial-judges, lawyers, and witnesses-live up to the standards that
our system of justice demands. Finally, as in the
case of reports of arrests and requests for evidenct:,
reporting of the trial may evoke evidence that will
aid in convicting or exonerating the accused.

Many proposals have been made by different
hodies, many debates have been held, and many
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recommendations have been heard dealing with
the problem. These recommendations include additional legislation giving the courts increased contempt powers, modifications and revisions of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association, and regulations and departmental
rules affecting law enforcement agencies. See Fair
Trial and Free Press, Reardon, op. cit., pp. 2-15. See
also Report of Symposium, Free Trial-Free Press,
J"Jew York State Bar Association (1966), reprinted m
Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 2 No. 3, (1966). For views
of the news media regarding censorship of criminal
proceedings, see reprint of speech of Clifton Daniel,
managing editor, New York Times. printed in
Journal ofthe National District Attorneys Association.
Vol. 1, No. 2, (1965).

It was stated in the Interim Report of the Special
Committee on Radio and Television of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Harold R.
Medina, Chairman, Columbia University Press, 1965,
at page 272:
The problem of free press versus fair trial is not n
new one. The last seventy years have witnessed
many unsuccessful attempts on the part of the news
media and bar representatives to formulate a satisfactory code of principles that would govern the
conduct of members of both professions.

Commenting on what controls should be placed
on police, lawyers, and the press by the courts, a.
special committee of the Bar of New in its final report entitled Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial. op.
cit., had the following comment:
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As usual there is, on the one hand, the question of
power or jurisdiction, and, on the other hand, the
question of policy. Moreover, one cannot consider
the two questions in vacuo. They must be discussed
in relation to the groups of persons who would be
affected by the control of prejudicial publicity. Thus,
starting with the commission of the crime or the
arrest of the accused, or the filing of the indictment
or the information, and continuing up to the time
of the trial or thereabouts, it is a serious question,
both of power and publicity, whether the court in
which the case is to be tried, or any courts, should,
by rule of court, by authority of legislative enactment, or by virtue of some competence supposed to
be inherent in the judicial function, have the right,
vis-a-vis, lawyers, members of the police force, or
representatives of the press, to proscribe to the publication or utterance of matters deemed prejudicial
to the right of the accused to a fair trial. If such
right exists, either actual or in ovo, then the judges,
in this pretrial period, must have the power to fine
and imprisonment for contempt of court all lawyers,
members of the police force, and representatives of
the press, who violate the orders of rules of proscription. The prospect, in this pretrial period, of
judges of various criminal courts of high and low
degree, sitting as petty tyrants, handing down sentences of fine and imprisonment for contempt of
court against lawyers, policemen, and reporters and
editors, is not attractive. Such an innovation might
well cut prejudicial publicity to a minimum. But at
what a price! (P. 39)

Concluding that such controls are unwise, the
report continued at page 40:
Nevertheless, with respect to the police and the
press in the entire pretrial period we think it unwise and detrimental to the public interest to give
such contempt powers to the comts and the judges.
Moreover, we think that such proceedings and court
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rules, legislation or whatnot else authorizing such
contempt proceedings might well be held to be a
violation of the first amendment guarantees of free
press and free speech. Furthermore, as to the police,
we find no authority inherent in the courts or the
judges to discipline them for alleged breach of their
duties as police officers.

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... .

This provision of the First Amendment has been
made applicable to the states through the due process clause. See Near v. Minnesota. 283, U.S. 697.
707; 51 S.Ct. 625, 628 (1930).
Yet the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend·
ments assure the accused a fair trial. The problem of
guaranteeing freedom of speech and press, while
at the same time guaranteeing to the accused a fair
trial is indeed difficult. Commenting on these concepts the United States Supreme Court in the casG
of Estes v. Texas. op. cit., held that Estes was deprived of his right under the Fourteenth Amend
ment to due process by the televising and broadcasting of his trial. In discussing the concepts referred to above, the court noted:
The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing
corruption among public officers and employees and
generally informing the citizenry of public events
and occurances, including court proceedings. While
maximum must be allowed the press in carrying on
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this i!llportant function in a democratic society, its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process.
While the state and federal courts have differed over
what spectators may be excluded from a criminal
trial, 6 Wigmore, Evidence, section 1834 (3rd addition 1940) . . . . primary concern of all must be the
proper administration of justice; that 'the life or
liberty of any individual in this land should not be
put in jeopardy because of actions of any news
media'; 'the due process requirements in both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the provisions of the Sixth Amendment require a procedure
that will assure a fair trial ... .'

Continuing, the court stated, at page 541:
It is true that the public has the right to be in-

formed as to what occurs in its courts, but reporters
of all media, including television, are always present
if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective
media. This was settled in Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 86 L.Ed. 192, 62 S.Ct. 190, 159 A.L.R.
1346 (1941), and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
391, 90 L.Ed. 1295, 66 S.Ct. 1209 (1946), which we
reaffirm. These reportorial privileges of the press
were stated years ago: 'The law, however, favors
publicity in legal proceedings, so far as that object
can be attained without injustice to the persons immediately concerned. The public are permitted to
attend nearly all judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no sufficient reason why they should
not also be allowed to see in print the reports of
trials, if they cannot have them presented as fully
as they are exhibited in court, or at least all the material portion of the proceedings impartially stated,
so that one shall not, by means of them, derive erroneous impressions, which he would not have been
likely to receive from hearing the trial itself.' 2
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 931-932 (Carrington Edition 1927).
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The United States Supreme Court in Sheppard
v. Maxwell, op. cit., acknowledged that a responsi- ·
ble press has always been regarded as the "handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field." The court further acknowledged that it has:
1

... been unwilling to place any direct limitation on
the freedom traditionally exercised by the news
media for 'what transpires in the courtroom is public property.' 16 L.Ed. 2d at 613.

Because of myriad views on prejudicial publicity and the general subject of free press-fair trial,
respondent is setting forth as an appendix to this
brief certain recommendations, positions taken and
views expressed by various Bar associations, the
United States Department of Justice and certain writers, as an aid to this court in the event it should
deem it advisable as part of the decision in this case
to set down guidelines to be followed in the future
by law enforcement personnel and agencies, prosecution and defense counsel, trial judges, and the
news media.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from an analysis of the record in
this case that the jury was not prejudiced by any
publicity occurring prior to or during trial, nor was
there any evidence of misconduct on the part of the
jury.

Appellant has failed to meet her burden of pro-
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ducing clear and convincing evidence of prejudice
and unfair trial.
Respondent submits that the totality of the circumstances do not show that appellant was not accorded a fair trial.
Respondent respectfully submits that the judc;ment of the District Court denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WARREN M. WEGGELAND
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX
A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE POLICE, PR.OSECUTING ATTORNEYS,
DEFENSE COUNSEL, JUDGES, AND THE NEWS
MEDIA WITH RESPECT TO CRIME NEWS RELEASES
AND REPORTING.

The following is a statement of principles for
the guidance of the police, prosecuting attorneys,
defense counsel, judges and the news media with
respect to crime news releases and reporting. 11
The police, prosecuting attorneys, defense counsel,
judges, and newsmen who have participated in this
conference recognize their responsibilities to protect the right of an accused person to a fair trial.
We believe that a proper balance can be maintained
between freedom of the press and the right of an
accused person to a fair trial by adherence to the
following principles on the part of the police, prosecuting attorneys, defense counsel, judges, and newsmen:
1. It is the responsibility of the police to investigate violations of the criminal law and to
report their findings to the authority charged
with the prosecution of criminal offenses. In
disclosing to the news media the progress of a
criminal investigation, the police should avoid
speculation, theories, and conclusions which
characterize any person in custody as guilty of
the offense.

2. Once a person is formally charged with a
criminal offense, neither the prosecuting nor
the defense counsel should make any statement for publication purposes with respect to
I/ Report of the Proceedings of a Conference on Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, Free press - Fair trial, Northwestern University
School of Law, Fred E. Inbau, editor, (1964).
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the ;~nilt or innocence of the accused, or with
resp2ct to the evidence eiihei' atto<nev n1av
vie~v D.s supporting his side of the case. .
. ·'
Any violation of this obligation should be considered as unethical conduct and subject to appropriate disciplinary actions by the organized
bar or the courts.
3. Judges should utilize all rernedies available
undt:r the lav<' to insure that jurors arc not subjected to outside influences and that they, in
fact, are complying with the instructions and
mandates of the court with respect to such influences.
4. It is the responsibility of the free press to
report the occurance of crime and the disposition of criminal offenders in the courts of this
country.
The day has long since passed when the average
citizen can observe in person that justice is
being administered in onr courts; the public
must rely, therefore, upon the news media to
report-promptly and accurately--the disposition of criminal cases in the courts.
Diver;;ic'nt views prevent us from satisfactorily
resolving the controversy as to ·whether it is a
fact that news reporting can be so prejudicial
as to actually interfere with an accused person's right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, we are
concerned with the trend of recent appellate
court cases which seem to act upon that assumption and thereb~' reverse the convictions
of 2tCCused persons on the ground of prejudicial
news reporting.
It is the sense of this conference, therefore, that
the news media, in reportin; crirne and th::
administration of criminal justice in this country, should refrain from the following practices:
(a)

Publicity which may result in a hos
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tile atmosphere prejudicial to the accused
at the time of his trial;
(b) Over-emphasis upon the past criminal record of an accused person in relation to the crime for which he has been on
trial;
(c) Detailed reporting of any statement
labeled by the police or prosecution as a
confession of guilt;
( d) Reporting events at the trial which
the court has, in accordance with long
established rules of evidence, excluded
from the consideration of the jury, and
which are inflammatory or extraneous to
the merits of the matter on trial that it
would be decidedly unfair to the accused
that the jury should learn of such matters
through a news communication.2/

\VHAT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY?
(Synopsis)

Le Wine, What Constitutes Prejudicial Publici1y
in Pending Cases, ABA Journal. Vol. 51, No. 10, Oct.
1965.
1. Publication of alleged confessions
2.

Publication of prior criminal convictions and
conduct

3. Inadmissable evidence in general
4. Tangible evidence connecting the accused with
the commission of the crime charged
5. Evidentiary facts generally
6. Matters excluded from evidence by the judge
! The :ilatement of policy was not adopted by the conference.
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7. Out of court statements of

witrn~ssc~;

8. Personal opinions ns to the guilt of the accused
9. Comments on evidence introduced and the credibility of witnesses
10. Inflammatory publicity and sensationalism
tending to charge the community v:ith an emotional atmosphere
11. Articles relnting generally too. p2nding proceeding bearing incidentally on the issues to be decided
12. Intimidation of jurors or matter intended to
coerce or influence jurors by intimidation
13. False or misleading reports of proceedings
14. Publications affecting witnesses tending to influence or discourage their testimony
MASSACHUSETTS
The Introduction to the Massachusetts Guide for the
Bar and News Media contains Articles I and VI of the
Amendments to the United States Constitutions. It con·
tinues:
In an attempt to reconcile long-standing divergence of opinion
as to the relative rights of the press and that of the individual
to a fair trial, a special Massachusetts Bar-Press Committee
was established in the fall of 1960. After two and a half years
of study and discussion, the Committee, with the aid of observers from the judiciary, drafted a Guide which was approved
by the Committee. Subsequently ratified by the four sponsoring groups, the Guide was adopted by 26 daily and 31 weekly
newspapers in the State.

The Guide was approve<l in June, 1963, and has been
adopted by the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations
the Massachusetts Newspaper Information fa,rvicc, and the
Massachusetts Broadcasters Association. The Guide reads:
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Preamble
1. To promote closer understanding between the bar and
the press, especially in their efforts to reconcile the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press and the right to a fair, impartial trial, the following mutual and voluntary statement of
principles is recommended to all members of both professions.

2.

Both professions, recognizing that freedom of the press

is one of the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution, agree that this
fundamental freedom must be zealously preserved and responsibly exercised subject only to those restrictions designed to
safeguard equally fundamental rights of the individual.
3. It is likewise agreed that both the press and the bar
are obliged to preserve the principle of the presumption of innocence for those accused of wrongdoing pending a finding of
guilty.

4. The press and the bar concur on the importance of the
natural right of the members of an organized society to acquire
and impart information about their common interests.
5. It is further agreed, however, that the inherent right
of society's members to impart and acquire information should
be exercised with discretion at those times when public disclosures would jeopardize the ends of justice, public security and
other rights of individuals.
6. The press and the bar recognize that there may arise
circumstances in which disclosures of names of individuals involved in matters coming to the attention of the general publi.:;
would result in personal danger, harm to the reputation of a person or persons or notoriety to an innocent third party.
7. Consistent with the principles of this preamble, it is the
responsibility of the bar, no less than that of the press to support the free flow of information.

For the Press
Newspapers in publishing accounts of crime should keri1 in
mind that the accused may be tried a court of law.

To preserve the individuals rights io a fair trial ,news
3tories of crime should contain only a factual statement of the
arrest and attending circumstances.
The following should be avoided:
1. Publication of interviews with subopenaed witnr:sses
after an indictment is returne<l.

2. Publication of the criminal record or discreditable act~
of the accused after an indictment is returned or during the trial
unless made part of the e\'idence in the court record. The dr··
fendant is being tried on the charg·e for which is as accused ail(]
not on his record. (Publication of a criminal record could be
grounds for a libel suit.)
3. Publication of coufrssions after an indictment is !\:·
turned unless made a part of the evidence in the court record.

4. Publication of testimony stricken by the court unless
reported as having been stricken.
5. Editorial comment preceding or during trial,
to influence judge or jury.

tendin~

6. Publication of names of .iuveniles involved in juveniie
proceedings unless the names are released by the judge.
7. The publication of any "leaks," statements or conclusions
as to the innocence or guilt, implied or expressed, by the police
or prosecuting authorities or defense counsel.

For the Bar
To preserve the individual's rights to a fair trial in a court
of law the following guide lines arc prescribed for the Bar.
1. A factual statement of the arrest and circumstances and
incidents thereof of a person charged with a ci·ime is permis·
sible, but the following should be avoided:

(a)

Statements or conc]u,;iom; as to the innocence or guilt.
implied or expressed, by the prosecuting authorities or
defense counsel.

(b)

Out-of-court statements by prosecutor;; 01· defense attorneys to news media in adva11ce of 01· during trial,
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(cl

( d)

stating what they expect to prove, whom they propose
to c.:al\ as witnesses or public criticism of either judge
or jury.
Issuance by the prosecuting authorities, counsel for
the defense or any person having official connection
with the case of any statements relative to the conduct of the accused, statements, "confessions" or admissions made by the accused or other matters bearing on the issue to be tried.
Any other statement or press release to the news media
in which the source of the statement remains undisclosed.

9
At the same time, in the interest of fair and accurate
reporting, news media have a right to expect the cooperation 0f
the authorities in facilitating adequate coverage of the law enforcement process.

It is to be noted that while the Guide was at first designed for the bar and press, its provisions are by agreement
made applicable to the broadcast news media.
OREGON
The Oregon Statement of Principles is the product of
meetings and lengthy discussion periods held by the Ore~on
Bar-Press-Broadcasters Joint Committee beginning in
March, 1962. One month later, a final draft was completed
and approved by the original committee. During the summer
of 1962 the three groups involved gave approval to the code
at their annual meetings, and the Statement of Principles
was printed and distributed to all members of the Oregon
State Bar, the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association, and
the Oregon Association of Broadcasters. The text follows:
Oregon Bar
Press Broadcasters

Joint Statement of Principles
Oregon's Bill of Rights provides both for fair trials arid

lot freedom of the press. These rights are basic and unqualified.
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They are not ends in themselves but are necessary guarantors
of freedom for the individual and the public's rights to be informed. The necessity of preserving both the right to a fair
trial and the freedom to disseminate the news is of concern to
responsible members of the legal and journalistic professions and
is of equal concern to the public. At times these two rightR
appear to be in conflict with each other.
In an effort to mitigate this conflict, the Oregon State Bar,
the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association and the Oregon
Association of Broadcasters have adopted the following statement of principles to keep the public fully informed without
violating the rights of any individual.
1. The news media have the right and the responsibility
to print and to broadcast the truth.
2. However, the demands of accuracy and objectivity in
news reporting should be balanced with the demands of fair
play. The public has a right to be informed. The accused has the
right to be judged in an atmosphere free from undue prejudice.
3. Good taste should prevail in the selection, printing and
broadcasting of the news. Morbid or sensational details of criminal behavior should not be exploited.
4. The right of decision about the news rests with the
editor or news director. In the exercise of judgment he should
consider that:
(a)

an accused person is presumed innocent until proven
guilty;

(b)

readers and listeners are potential jurors;

(c)

no person's reputation should be injured needlessly.

5. The public is entitled to know how justice is being administered. However, it is unprofessional for any lawyer to exploit any medium of public information to enhance his side of a
pending case. It follows that the public prosecutor should avoid
taking unfair advantage of his position as an important source
of news; this shall not be construed to limit his obligation to
make available information to which the public is entitled.
In recognition of these principles, the undersigned hereby
testify to their continuing desire to achieve the best possible ac·
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commoclation of the rights of the individual and the rights of
1he public when these two fundamental precepts appear to be
in conflict in the administration of justice.

PART 1. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES
1.1

Revision of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

It is recommneded that the Canons of Professional
Ethics he revised to contain the following standards relating to public discussion of pending or imminent criminal
litigation:
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize
the release of information or opinion for dissemination by
means of public communications, in connection with pending or immiment criminal litigation with which he is associated, if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise
prejudice the due administration of justice.
With respect to a grand jury or other pending investigation of any criminal matter, a lawyer participating in
the investigation shall refrain from making any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any means of
public communication, that goes beyond the public record
01· that is not necessary to inform the public that the investigation is underway, to describe the general scope of
the investigation, to obtain assistance in the apprehension
of a suspect, to warn the public of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the investigation.

From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant,
or the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment in
any criminal matter until the commenc~ment of trial or
disposition without trial, a lawyer associated with the
prosecution or defense shall not release or authorize the
releage of any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination
by any means of public communication, relating to that
matter and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, in·
dictments, or other charges of crin:e), or the character

~
I
I

,
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or reputation of the defendant, except that the lawyer
may make a factual statement of the defendant's name
age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if th~
defendant has not been apprehended, r:~ay release any
information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to
warn the public of any dangers he may present;
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the defendant, or the
refusal or failure of the defendant to make any state.
ment;
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or
the defendant's refusal or failure to submit to an ex·
amination or test;
( 4) The identity testimony, or credibility of pros pee·
tive witnesses, except that the lawyer may announce
the identity of the victim if the announcement is not
otherwise prohibited by law;
( 5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense
charged or a lesser offense;
(6) The defendant's guilt or innocence or other mat·
ters relating to the merits of the case or the evidence
in the case, except that the lawyer may announce the
circumstances of arrest, including time and place of
arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons; may
announce the identity of the investigating and arrest·
ing officer or agency and the length of the investiga·
tion; may make an announcement, at the time of the
seizure, describing any evidence seized; may disclose
the nature, substance, or text of the charge, including
a brief description of the offense charged; may quote
from or refer without commfmt to public records of the
court in the case; may announce the scheduling or result
of any stage in the judicial process; may request assist·
ance in obtaining evidence; and, on behalf of his clien~,
may announce without further comment that the ch·
ent denies the charges made against him.
During the trial of an:v criminal matter, including the
period of selection of I he jury, no lawyer associated with
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the prosecution or defense shall give or authorize any
extrajudicial statement or interview, relating to the trial
or the parties or issues in the trial, for dissemination by
any means of public communication, except that the lawyer may quote from or refer without comment to public
records of the court in the case.
After the completion of a trial or disposition without
trial of any criminal matter, and while the matter is still
pending in any court, a lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense shall refrain from making or authorizing
any extrajudicial statement for dissemination by any
means of public communication if there is a reasonable
likelihood that such dissemination will affect judgment or
sentence or otherwise prejudice the due administration of
justice.
Nothing in this Canon is intended to preclude the formu·
lation or application of more restrictive rules relating to
the release of information about juvenile or other offenders, to preclude the holding of hearings by legislative,
administrative, or investigative bodjes, or to preclude any
lawyer from replying to charges of misconduct that are
publicly made against him.
1.2

Rule of court.

In any jurisdiction in which Canons of Professional
Ethics have not been adopted by statute or court rule, it
is recommended that the ,;;ubstance of the foregoing section
be adopted as a rule of court governing the conduct of attorneys.
1.3

Enforcement.

It is recommended that violation of the standards set
forth in section 1.1 shall be grounds for judicial and bar
association reprimand or for suspension from practice and,
in more serious cases, for disham1ent or punishment for
contempt of court. It is further recommended that any attorney or bar association be allowed to petition an appropriate court for the institution of contempt proceedings,
and that the court have discretion to initiate such proceedings, either on the basis of such a petition or on i~H O'.I Ll
motion.
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PART II. RECOM;\1ENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AN!J
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES IN CRIMINAL CASES
2.1

Rule of court relating to disclosures by law enforcement
officers.

It is recomm.Pnded that the following rule be promulgated in each jurisdiction by the appropriate court:

Release of information by law enforcement officers.
From th~ time of arrest, issuance of an arrest wanant,
or filing of any complaint, information, or indictment in
any criminal matter within the jurisdiction of this court,
until the completion of trial or disposition without trial.
no law enforcement officer sub.iect to the jurisdiction of
this court shall release or authorize the release of any
extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any meam
of public communication, relating to that matter and con·
ceming:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, in·
dictments, or other charges of crime), or the character
or reputation of the defendant, except that the officer
may make a factual statement of the defendant's name,
age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if th~
defendant has not been apprehended, 1:r::iy release an)
information necessary to aid in his apprehension or lo
warn the public of any dangers he may present;

(2) The existence or contents of any confession, ad·
mission, or statement given by the defendant, or the
refusal or failure of the defendant to make any state·
ment;

(3) 'I'he performance of any examinations or tests o-.
the defendant's refusal or failure to submit to an ex·
amination or test;
( 4) The identity testirron:v, or credibility of prospec·
tive witnesses, except that the officer may announce the
identitv of the victim if the announcement is not other·
wise p;ohibited by law;
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( 5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense
charged or a lesser offense;
(6) The defendant's guilt or innocence, or other matters relating to the merits of the case or the evidence
in the case, except that the officer may announce the
circumstances of arr~st, including the time and place of
arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons; may announce the identity of the investigating and arresting
officer or agency and the length of the investigation;
may make an announcement, at the time of the seizure,
describing any evidence seized; may disclose the nature,
substance, or text of the charge, including a brief description of the offense charged; may quote from or
refer without comment to public records of the court
in the case; may announce the scheduling or result of
any stage in the .iudicial process; and may request assistance in obtaining evidence.
The court may, in its discretion, initiate proceedings for
contempt for violation of this rule, either on its own motion or on the petition of any person.
Nothing in this rule is intended to preclude any law
enforcement officer for replying to charges of misconduct
that are publicly made against him, to preclude any law
enforcement authority from issuing rules not in conflict
herewith on this or related subjects, to preclude any law
enforcement officer from participating in any legislative,
administrative, or investigative hearing, or to supersede
any more restrictive, or investigative hearing, or to supersede any more restrictive rule governing the release of in·
formation concerning juvenile or other offenders.
For purposes of this rule, the term 'law enforcement
officer' includes any person employed or retained by any
governmental agency to assist in the investigation of crime
or iri ·nre apprehension or prosecution of persons suspected
of or charged with crime.
2.2

Departmental rules.

It is recommended that law enforcement authorities in
each jurisdiction promulgate an internal regulation (1)
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embodying the prohibitions of the preceding section and
(2) directing that releases not prohibited by that section
be withheld during the relevant period if the information
would be highly prejudicial and if public disclosure would
serve no significant law enforcement function. It is fur.
ther recommended that such agencies adopt the following
internal regulations:
(a) A regulation governing the release of information,
relating to the commission of crimes and to their investi·
gation, prior to the making of an an arrest or the filing
of formal charges. This regulation should establish ap·
propriate procedures for the release of information. It
should further provide that, when a crime is believed to
have been committed, pertinent facts relating to the crime
itself may be made available but the identity of a suspect
prior to arrest and the details of investigative procedures
shall not be disclosed except to the extent necessary to
assist in the apprehension of the suspect, to warn the pub·
lie of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the investigation.

(b) A regulation prohibiting (i) the deliberate posing
of a person in custody for photographing or televising by
representatives of the news media and (ii) the interview·
ing by representatives of the news media of a person in
custody unless he requests an interview in writing after
being adequately informed of his right to consult with
counsel.
( c) A regulation providing for the enforcement of thPforegoing by the imposition of appropriate disciplinary
sanctions.
2.3

Rule of court relating to disclosures by judicial em·
ployees.

It is recommended that a rule of court be adopted in
each jurisdiction prohibiting any judicial employee front
disclosing, to any unauthorized person, information relat·
ing to a pending criminal case that is not part of the pub·
lie records of the court and that may tend to interfere
with the right of the people or of the defendant to a fair
trial. Particular reference should be made in this rule to
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the nature and result of any argument or hearing held in
chambers or otherwise outside the presence of the public
and not yet available to the public under the standards in
section 3.1 and section 3.5(d) of these recommendations.
Appropriate discipline, including proceedings for contempt,
should be provided for infractions of this rule.

PART Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
3.1

Pretrial hearings.

It is recommended that the following rule be adopted
in each jurisdiction by the appropriate court:

Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretricll
hearing.
In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case, including a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant may move that all or part
of the hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to
the public on the ground that dissemination of evidence
or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and
is therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless
the presiding officer determines that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference. With the consent of
the defendant, the presiding officer may take such action
on his own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution. Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial
hearing is held in chambers or otherwise closed to the
public, a complete record of the proceedings shall be kept
and shall be made available to the public following the
completion of trial or disposition of the case without trial.
Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with the power
of the presiding officer in any pretrial hearing to caution
those present that dissemination of certain information by
any means of public communication may jeopardize the
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
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3.2

Change of venue or continuance.

It is recommended that the following standards be
adopted in each jurisdiction to govern the consideration and
disposition of a motion in a criminal case for change of
venue or continuance based on a claim of threatened in·
terference with the right to a fair trial.

(a) Who may request.
Except as federal or state constitutional provisions oth·
erwise require, a change of venue or continuance may be
granted on motion of either the prosecution or the de·
fense.
(b) Methods of proof.
In addition to the testimony or affidavits of individuals
in the community, which shall not be required as a condi·
tion to the granting of a motion for change of venue or con·
tinuance, qualified public opinion surveys shall be ad·
missible as well as other materials having probative value.

( c) Standards for granting motion.
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be
granted whenever it is determined that because of the dis·
semination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a
reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a
fair trial cannot be had. This determination may be based
on such evidence as qualified public opinion surveys are
opinion testimony offered by individuals, or on the couri's
own evaluation of the nature, frequency, and timing of
the material involved. A showing of actual prejudice shall
not he required.
(d) Same; time of disposition.
If a motion for change of venue or continuance is made
prior to the impaneling of the jury, the motion shall be
disposed of before impaneling. If such a motion is per·
mitted to be made, or if reconsideration or review of a
prior denial is sought, after the jury has been selected, the
fact that a jury satisfying prevailing standards of accept·
ability has been selected shall not be controlling if the
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record shows that the criterion for the granting of relief
set forth in subsection ( c) has been met.
( e) Limitations; waiver.
It shall not be a ground for denial of a change of venue
that one such change has already been granted. The claim
that the venue should have been changed or a continuance
granted shall not be considered to have been waived by the
waiver of the right to trial by jury or by the failure to exercise all available peremptory challenges.

3.3

Waiver of jury.

In those jurisdictions in which the defendant does not
have an absolute right to waive a jury in a criminal case,
it is recommended that the defendant be permitted to
waive whenever it is determined that (I) the waiver has
been knowlingly and voluntarily made, and (2) there is
reason to believe that, as a result of the dissemination of
potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is required to
increase the likelihood of a fair trial.

3.4

Selecting the jury.

It is recommended that the following standards be
adopted in each jurisdiction to govern the selection of a
jury in those criminal cases in which questions of possible
prejudice are raised.

(a)

Method of examination.

Whenever there is believed to be a significant possibility
that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because
of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror with respect to his exposure shall
take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this examination
shall be kept, by court reporter or tape recording whenever possible. The questioning shall be conducted for the
purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read
and heard about the case and how his exposure has affected his attitude towards the trial, not to convince him
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that he would be derelict in his duty if he could not cast
aside any preconceptions he might have.
(b)

Standard of acceptability.

Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's
testimony as to his state of mind are relevant to the de·
termination of acceptability. A prospective juror who
states that he will be unable to overcome his preconcep·
tions shall be subject to challenge for cause no matter how
slight his exposure. If he has seen or heard and remembers
information that will be developed in the course of trial,
or that may be inadmissible but is not so prejudicial as w
create a substantial risk that his judgment will be affected.
his acceptability shall turn on whether his testimony as w
impartiality is believed. If he admits to having formed an
opinion, he shall be subject to challenge for cause unless
the examination shows uniquivocally that he can be iw·
partial. A prospective juror who has been exposed to and
remembers reports of highly significant information, such
as the existence or contents of a confession, or other in·
criminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence,
or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be
subject to challenge for cause without regard to his testi·
mony as to his state of mind.
( c) Sourc~ of the panel.
Whenever it is determined that potentially prejudicial
news coverage of a given criminal matter has been intense
and has been concentrated primarily in a given locality
in a state (or federal district), the court shall have author·
ity to draw jurors from other localities in that state (or
district).
3.5

Conduct of the trial.
It is recommended that the following standards hi
adopted in each jurisdiction to govern the conduct of a
criminal trial when problems relating to the dissemination
of potentially prejudicial material are raised.
(a) Use of the courtroom.
Whenever appropriate in view of the notoriety of thr
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case or the number or conduct of news media representa·
tives present at any judicial proceeding, the court shall
ensure the preservation of decorum by instructing those
representatives and others as to the permissible use of
the courtroom, the assignment of seats, and other matters
that may affect the conduct of the proceeding.
(b)

Sequestration of jury.

Either party shall be permitted to move for sequestration of the jury at the beginning of trial or at any time
during the course of the trial, and, in appropriate circumstances, the court shall order sequestration on its own mo·
tion. Sequestration shall be ordered if it is determined that
the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a
nature that, in the absence of sequestration, highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the attention of the
jurors. Whenever sequestration is ordered, the court in advising the jury of the decision shall not disclose which
party requested sequestration.
(c)

Cautioning parties and witnesses; insulating witnesses.

When appropriate in light of the issues in the case or
the notoriety of the case, the court shall instruct parties
and witnesses not to make extra.iudicial statements, relating to the case or the issues in the case, for dissemination
by any means of public communication during the course
of the trial. The court may also order sequestration of
witnesses, prior to their appearance, when it appears like·
ly that in the absence of sequestration they will be exposed to extra-judicial reports that may influence their
testimony.
( d) Exclusion of the public from hearings or arguments
outside the presence of the jury.
If the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be
permitted to move that the public be exclud:-d from any
portion of the trial that takes place outside the presence
of the jury on the ground that dissemination of evidence
or argument adduced at the hearing is likely to intc:fcrc
with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial
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.iury. The motion shall be granted unless it is determined
that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference. With the consent of the defendant, the court may
take such action on its own motion or at the suggestio~
of the prosecution. Whenever such action is taken, a com.
plete record of the proceedings from which the public has
been excluded shall be kept and shall be made available
to the public following the completion of the trial. Noth.
ing in this recommendation is intended to interfere with
the power of the court, in connection with any hearing
held outside the presence of the jury, to caution those
present that dissemination of specified information by any
means of public communication, prior to the rendering of
the verdict, may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.
( e)

Cautioning jurors.

In any case that appears likely to be of siginificanl
public interest, an admonition in substantially the follow·
ing form shall be given before the end of the first day if
the jury is not sequestered.
During the time you serve on this jury, there may appear in the
newspapers or on radio or television reports concerning this case,
and you may be tempted to read, listen to, or watch them. Please
do not do so. Due process of law requires that the evidence to be
considered by you in reaching your verdict meet certain standards
-for example, a witness may testify about events he himseU
has seen or heard but not about matters of which he was told
by others. Also, witnesses must be sworn to tell the truth and
must be subject to cross-examination. News reports about the
case are not subject to these standards, and if You read, listen
to, or watch these reports, you may be exposed to misleading. or
inaccurate information which unduly favors one side and to which
the other side is unable to respond. In fairness to both sides.
therefore, it is essential that you comply with this instruction.

If the process of selecting a jury is a lengthy one, such an
admonition shall also be given to each juror as he is select·
ed. At the end of each subsequent flay of the trial, and at
other recess periods if the court deems necessary, an ad·
monition in substantially the following form shall be given:
For the reasons stated earlier in the trial, I must remind you 1101
to read, listen to, or watch any news reports concerning this cw
while you are serving on this jury.
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(f) Questioning jurors about exposure to potentially
prejudicial material in the course of the trial; standard
for excusing a juror.
If it is determined that material disseminated during
the trial raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the
court may on its own motion or shall on motion of either
party question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material. The method of
examination shall be the same as that recommended in
section 3.4(a), above. The standard for excusing a juror
who is challenged on the basis of such exposure shall be
the same as the standard of acceptability recommended in
section 3.4(b), above, except that a juror who has seen
or heard reports of potentially prejudicial material shall
be excused if the material in question would furnish
grounds for a mistrial if referred to in the trial itself.

3.6

Setting aside the verdict.

It is recommended that, on motion of the defendant, a
verdict of guilty in any criminal case be set aside and a
new trial granted whenever, on the basis of competent evidence, the court finds a substantial likelihood that the
vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to
an extrajudicial communication of any matter relating to
the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the
trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury.
Nothing in this recommendation is intended to affect the
rule in any jurisdiction as to whether and in what circumstances a juror may impeach his own verdict or as to what
other evidence is competent for that purpose.

PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
EXERCISE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER
4.1

Limited use of the contempt power.

The use of the contempt power against persons who disseminate information by means of public communication,
or who make statements for dissemination, can in certain
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circumstances raise grave constitutional questions. Apart
from these questions, indiscriminate use of that power can
cause unnecessary friction and stifle desirable discussion.
On the other hand, it is essential that deliberate action
constituting a serious threat to a fair trial not go un.
punished and that valid court orders be obeyed. It is
therefore recommended that the contempt power should
be used only with considerable caution but should be exercised in at least the following instances, in addition to
those specified in sections 1.3, 2.1, and 2.3, above:
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal
trial by jury is in progress or that a jury is being select·
ed for such a trial:
(i) disseminates by any means of public communi·
cation an extrajudicial statement relating to the de·
fendant or to the issues in the case that goes beyond
the public record of the court in the case, if the state·
ment is reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of
the trial and seriously threatens to have such an effect;
or
(ii) makes such a statement with the expectation
that it will be so disseminated.

(b) Against a person who knowingly violates a valid
judicial order not to disseminate until completion of the
trial or disposition without trial, specified information
referred to in the course of a judicial hearing from which
the public is excluded under sections 3.1 or 3.5 ( d) of these
recommendations.
4.2

Reimbursement of defendant.

In the event that a mistrial or change of venue is granted
or a conviction set aside, as a result of an extrajudicial
statement held to be in contempt of court, it is reco111·
mended that the court have the authority to require that
all or part of the proceeds of any fine be used to reimburse
the defendant for the additional legal fees and other ex·
penses fairly attributable to the order that the case be
tried in a different venue or tried again in the same venue.
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POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
On April 16, 1965, Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach issued the following policy statement governing personnel of the Department of Justice and the release by them
of information in criminal proceedings to news media representatives:
The availability to news media of information in criminal
cases is a matter which has become increasingly a subject of
concern in the administration of criminal justice. The purpose
of this statement is to formulate specific guidelines for the release of such information by personnel of the Deaprtment of
Justice.
While the release of information for the purpose of influencing a trial is, of course, always improper, there are valid
reasons for making available to the public information about
the administration of the criminal laws. The task of striking a
fair balance between the protection of individuals accused of
crime and public understanding of the problems of controlling
crime depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment by
those responsible for administering the criminal laws and by
representatives of the press and other media.
Inasmuch as the Department of Justice has generally fulfilled its responsibilities with awareness and understanding of
the competing needs in this area, this statement, to a considerable
extent, reflects and formalizes the standards to which representatives of the Department have adhered in the past. Nonetheless,
it will be helpful in ensuring uniformity of practice to set forth
the following guidelines for all personnel of the Department
of Justice.
Because of the difficulty and importance of the questions
they raise, it is felt that some portions of the matters covered
by this statement, such as the authorization to make available
federal conviction records and a description of items seized at
the time of arrest, should be the subject of continuing review
and consideration by the Department on the basis of experience
aud suggestions from those within and outside the Department.
1. These guidelines shall apply to the release .of information to news media from the time a person is arrested or is
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charged with a criminal offense until the proceeding has been
terminated by trial or otherwise.
2. At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice
furnish any statement or information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial.
3. Personnel of the Department of Justice, subject to specific limitations imposed by law or court rule or order, may make
public the following information:
(a) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar background information.
(b) The substance or text of the charge, such as a complaint, indictment, or information.
(c) The identity of the investigating and arresting agency
and the length of the investigation.
( d) The circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest,
including the time and place of arrest, resistance, pu1··
suit, possession and use of weapons, and a description
of items seized at the time of arrest.

r

Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual mat- i
ters, and should not include subjective observations. In addi- I
tion, where background information or information relating to
the circumstances of an arrest would be highly prejudicial and
where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement function, such information should not be made public.
4. Personnel of the Department shall not volunteer for
publication any information concerning a defendant's prior crim·
inal record. However, this is not intended to alter the Department's present policy that, since federal criminal conviction rec·
ords are matters of public record permanently maintained in
the Department, this information may be made available upon
specific inquiry.
5. Because of the particular danger of prejudice resulting
from statements in the period approaching and during trial.
they ought strenuously to be avoided during that period. An)'
such statement or release shall be made only on the infrequent
occasion when circumstances absolutely demand a disclosure of
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information and shall include only information which is clearly
not prejudicial.
6. The release of certain types of information generally
tends to create dangers of prejudice without serving a significant
law enforcement function. Therefore, personnel of the Department
should refrain from making available the following:
(a) Observations about a defendant's character.
(b) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant.
( c)

References to investigative procedures, such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or laboratory tests.

( d) Statements concerning the identity, credibility, or testimony of prospective witnesses.
(e)

Statements concerning evidence or argument in the
case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial.

7. Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no
action tn encourage or assist news media in photographing or
televising a defendant or accused person being held or trans··
portPd in federal custody. Departmental representatives should
not make available photographs of a defendant unless a law
enforcement function is served thereby.
8. This statement of policy is not intended to restrict the
release of information concerning a defendant who is a fugitive
from justice.
9. Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guidelines, there will, of course, be situations
in which it will limit release of information which would not be
prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representative of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair
administration of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be released in a particul~r case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney Gent·rril or the Deputy Attorney General to do so.

